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Here We Are Now, Entertain Us: 
Defining the Line Between 
Personal and Professional 
Context on Social Media 
 
Raizel Liebler and Keidra Chaney* 
 
Abstract 
 
Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
Instagram allow individuals and companies to connect directly 
and regularly with an audience of peers or with the public at 
large. These websites combine the audience-building platforms 
of mass media with the personal data and relationships of in-
person social networks. Due to a combination of evolving user 
activity and frequent updates to functionality and user features, 
social media tools blur the line of whether a speaker is perceived 
as speaking to a specific and presumed private audience, a 
public expression of one’s own personal views, or a 
representative viewpoint of an entire institution. However, the 
intent of the speaker is frequently lost to the wide and diverse 
breadth of social media audiences or obscured due to the 
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workings of the specific social media platform being used. 
In this article, we ask the question: should the job of 
drawing the line between personal and professional speech lie 
with the individual? Should the divide be clearly determined by 
the functionality of the social media platform or by third party 
processes and procedures such as organizational social media 
policies or by state/federal law? 
This issue of personal versus professional speech becomes 
increasingly relevant not only to public figures such as 
celebrities or athletes, but to anyone whose online or social 
media presence is directly or indirectly connected to a larger 
institution, such as a workplace or educational institution. As 
social media platforms and online culture encourage 
“transparency” and open sharing of personal details online, it is 
not always easy to determine when personal versus professional 
viewpoint is being represented via social media channels. When 
an individual shares a controversial opinion outside of work, it 
is not necessarily representative of their workplace, yet may be 
perceived as such. When does an employer have the right to 
monitor or dictate an individual’s online communications? 
The line is difficult for everyone to walk – from the 
perspective of both employers and employees, considering that 
employees generally want to remain employed and employers 
generally want to minimize anything negative reflecting back on 
the employer. In this article, we discuss the tenuous balancing 
act between the interests of a brand/employer with those of the 
individual/employee regarding social media communications. 
We illustrate this tension through the example of the 
regulation of student-athletes within institutions of higher 
education, considering they now might be considered to be 
employees. However, we conclude that the challenges in 
developing law and policy around social media speech are due 
to a number of issues, including the rapid pace of development 
of social media platforms. Social media gives greater access into 
the lives of individuals due to emerging social norms that 
encourage open sharing of personal information online. At the 
same time, social media tools are used by companies to promote 
a curated brand identity for marketing purposes.  Social media 
policies created both internally by employers and those 
established by law and policymakers focus almost exclusively on 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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the interests of companies regarding social media, rather than 
the individual interests of those who participate on social media 
to connect with peers. 
We conclude that the present approach that federal 
financial regulators take regarding social media is the closest to 
a well-balanced test as presently available – in this test, whether 
an employer can take action against an employee is grounded 
on whether a statement could be seen as directed by or an 
official statement of the employer. A national standard 
following this overall approach would best balance the interests 
of both employers and employees. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
Instagram allow individuals and companies with a unique 
online platform to connect directly, personally, and regularly 
with an audience of peers or with the public at large. These 
services combine the audience-building platforms of mass 
media with the personal data and relationships of in-person 
social networks. 
Social media also creates new challenges and previously 
unheard of issues for both individuals and companies, 
including the gray area between personal statements intended 
for peers and commentary geared toward the public at large. 
Even before the advent of social media there have been 
examples of how this gray area impacts both individuals and 
business, most specifically when individuals post inappropriate 
or personally damaging personal information online. This 
information may range from evidence of crimes, confidential 
professional information, threats, racist or sexist statements, 
or ill-conceived statements of personal opinion. 
There has been no shortage of examples of individuals 
sharing inappropriate or crude statements with the public at 
large. However, due to a combination of evolving user activity 
and frequent updates to the functionality and user features of 
social networking websites, these platforms often complicate 
the issue of who the perceived audience is: a selected group of 
peers, or the public. 
On social media platforms, individuals often attempt to 
3
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define a line between conversation intended for a specific, 
limited audience, an outward expression of one’s own views, or 
a representative viewpoint of an entire institution. However, 
that line is not always easily recognized by a wide and diverse 
breadth of social media audiences or shown by the social media 
platform being used.  In this article, we ask the question: 
should the job of drawing the line between personal and 
professional speech lie with the individual? Should it be clearly 
determined by the functionality of the social media platform or 
by third party processes and procedures such as organizational 
social media policies or state/federal law? 
This issue becomes increasingly relevant not only to public 
figures such as celebrities or athletes, but to anyone whose 
online or social media presence is directly or indirectly 
connected to a larger institution (workplace, school, church, 
etc.) As social media tools and culture encourage 
“transparency” and open sharing of personal details online, it is 
not always clear whose viewpoint is being represented via 
social media. When an individual shares a controversial 
opinion outside of work, it is not necessarily representative of 
their workplace, yet may be perceived as such. When does an 
employer have the right to monitor or dictate an individual’s 
online communications? 
The line is difficult for everyone to walk – from the 
perspective of both employers and employees, considering that 
employees generally want to remain employed and employers 
generally want to minimize anything negative reflecting back 
on the employer. In this article, we discuss below, the tenuous 
balancing act between the interests of a brand/employer with 
those of the individual/employee regarding social media 
communications. We illustrate this through several examples, 
most specifically focusing on the regulation of student-athletes 
within institutions of higher education, considering they now 
might be considered employees. However, we conclude that the 
challenges in developing law and policy around social media 
speech are due to a number of issues; the first being the rapid 
pace of the development of social media platforms. Other issues 
include the gray area that emerges from differing usage 
patterns between individuals and companies. Social media 
gives greater access into the lives of individuals due to 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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emerging social norms that encourage open sharing of personal 
information online. At the same time, social media tools are 
used by companies to promote a curated brand identity for 
marketing purposes.  Social media policies created both 
internally by employers and those established by law and 
policymakers focus almost exclusively on the interests of 
companies with regard to social media, rather than the 
individual interests of those who participate on social media to 
connect with peers. 
First, we explore the history of social media platforms and 
the evolution of these private, closed networks into audience-
driven mass media tools. Then we give an overview of the 
history of social media and its relationship to employment. 
Next, we present an overview of the current law regarding 
social media and employment. Finally, we conclude that the 
approach that federal financial regulators take regarding social 
media is the closest to a well-balanced test as presently in the 
law – in this test, whether an employer can take action against 
an employee is whether a statement could be seen as directed 
by or is the official statement of the employer. A national 
standard following this approach would best balance the 
privacy interests of employees and “branding” interests of 
employers. 
 
II. From “Social Networking” to “Social Media” 
 
Early social networking websites such as Friendster and 
Myspace were intended to establish online networks among 
like-minded peers and friends. At the same time there was 
some debate within professional circles (primarily marketing, 
advertising, and technology startups) about exactly what to call 
this emerging online activity and the tools that make it 
possible. Several names were in regular usage: “social media,” 
“social networks,” and “social networking,” for example. In 
2007, researchers danah boyd and Nicole Ellison attempted to 
define the parameters of social networking websites with the 
following description: 
 
[Social networks are] web-based services that 
allow individuals to (1) construct a public or 
5
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semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) 
articulate a list of other users with whom they 
share a connection, and (3) view and traverse 
their list of connections and those made by others 
within the system.1 
 
While boyd’s and Ellison’s definition of these platforms was 
an accurate reflection of this technology at the time, social 
networking platforms quickly evolved into something quite 
different than their initial description and usage. While 
searchable and static personal profiles were a defining 
characteristic of early social networking websites, in 
subsequent years, social networks began to introduce 
functionality that shifted the platform’s focus from 
communicating with a select social network to a broad, 
presumably public audience. Among this functionality includes 
long-form status updates, publicly viewable content streams 
organized by keywords through so-called “hashtags,” and paid 
advertising functionalities, made available to both individuals 
and companies. At the same time, individual users of these 
platforms continue to use these websites as networks – a 
service to connect with friends, and family, or to connect with 
those of like-minded interests. 
After 2007, social networking websites became more 
formally established as audience-driven media services. 
Facebook’s introduction of the “News Feed” functionality in 
2006 made it possible for individuals (and businesses) within 
Facebook to update content regularly that could be viewed in 
real time by “friends” within the social network. In November 
2007, Facebook rolled out specialized profiles for businesses 
(called business pages) that were intended to allow companies 
to market their services towards customers.2 
On the other hand, Twitter’s evolution into a corporate 
brand communication tool was not quite as intentional. Twitter 
 
1. Nicole B. Ellison & danah m. boyd, Sociality Through  Social  Network 
 Sites, in THE  OXFORD  HANDBOOK  OF  INTERNET  STUDIES 151-72 (William H. 
Dutton ed., 2013). 
2. Howard Greenstein, Facebook Pages vs Facebook Groups: What's the 
Difference?, MASHABLE (May 27, 2009), 
http://mashable.com/2009/05/27/facebook-page-vs-group/. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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was originally conceived by co-founder Jack Dorsey as an SMS 
service that allowed people to communicate with a small 
group.3  While the original concept of Twitter was intended for 
a limited audience, users quickly adapted the use of Twitter’s 
functionality for more audience-centric communications.  The 
2007 South By Southwest Interactive Conference was another 
milestone event toward the evolution from social networking to 
social media, as the service was used as a public 
communication tool; the company placed two 60-inch plasma 
screens in conference hallways to show Twitter messages, and 
the service was used by conference attendees to report on the 
event in real time.  During the conference, Twitter usage rose 
from 20,000 tweets per day to 60,000.4 
As more marketing and advertising professionals began to 
use social media platforms to promote corporate brands, 
individual users themselves began to use social media as a 
platform for building a professional public identity, or 
“personal brand.”  While the concept of personal branding 
certainly did not originate with social media platforms, social 
media websites have become a common and popular tool for 
individuals to create and maintain a professional persona or 
demonstrate their area of expertise.  Social network websites 
are comprised of a broad public audience in which an 
individual can develop a public persona through creating and 
sharing original online content, or curating the content of 
others. 
Because of the importance of websites, social networks, 
and other online tools for corporate branding and identity, 
there is a history of tension between the use of these platforms 
as a tool for personal expression compared to the use as 
marketing/promotional tools for businesses and other 
organizational entities.  The history of personal versus 
professional identity online, and more specifically, the threat of 
losing one’s job due to online communication, started well 
before the advent of social media websites.  One early and 
 
3. Claire Cain Miller, Why Twitter's C.E.O. Demoted Himself, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at BU1. 
4. Nick Douglas, Twitter Blows Up at SXSW Conference, GAWKER (Mar. 
12, 2007, 8:25 PM), http://gawker.com/243634/twitter-blows-up-at-sxsw-
conference. 
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notable example was web designer and blogger Heather 
Armstrong, who kept a personal website called Dooce for 13 
years.   Armstrong was fired in 2002 by her startup employer 
after writing satirical posts about her time there.  Being 
“dooced” later came to be used by online users and the media as 
a euphemism for losing one’s job because of a blog or website.5 
Because businesses want to protect their interests, 
employers created policies regarding speech, especially policies 
targeted toward non-polite or harassing speech, disparagement 
of the company’s services or products, disclosure of sensitive 
information (such as trade secrets), and criticism of workplace 
management. Sometimes employer policy creation makes sense 
in response to employees frequently using social media 
platforms to publicly discuss their workplace, people at their 
workplace, and their work itself. But policy creation by 
employers is also part of a larger trend by employers to 
increasingly control aspects of their employees’ lives, ranging 
from compelled after-hours socializing to smoking restrictions.6 
Therefore, social media’s widespread usage has led to a 
number of cases of individuals being fired for statements made 
online.7  But employers have also fired people based on actions, 
 
5. Miles Klee, A Very Personal History of Getting Fired Over a Blog, 
DAILY DOT (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/lifestyle/fired-for-my-
blog-dooced-personal-history/. 
6. See Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism and the Law of Employment 
Discrimination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 571, 571 (2014) (“Recently, several employers 
around the country announced they would no longer hire applicants who use 
nicotine, even off the clock”); Stephen D. Sugarman, "Lifestyle" 
Discrimination in Employment, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 381 
(2003) (“[S]hould society intervene--and if so, when and through what legal 
mechanisms--to preclude employers from making hiring, promotion, 
discharge, discipline and other job decisions based on off-the-job conduct?”). 
7. See Ryan Broderick and Emanuella Grinberg, 10 People Who Learned 
Social Media Can Get You Fired, CNN (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/06/living/buzzfeed-social-media-fired/; See 
Spectrum Workers Fired Over Facebook Picture, WZZM 13 (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://www.wzzm13.com/story/news/local/metro/2014/02/05/1609120/ (writing 
that multiple hospital workers were fired when a photograph of the backside 
of an unknown women was posted on Facebook with the caption, “I like what 
I like”); See David Kaplan, Francesca’s CFO Fired Over Use of Social Media, 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE (May 14, 2012), 
http://www.chron.com/business/article/Francesca-s-CFO-fired-over-use-of-
social-media-3558203.php (noting that the CFO Gene Morphis was fired for 
improperly communicating information about the company through social 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
  
406 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:1 
rather than speech.  Social media can draw publicity to 
conflicting viewpoints between employers and employees, when 
employees are fired for legal activities outside of work of which 
the employer does not approve.  Some examples include the 
seemingly never-ending stream of teachers who are fired for 
previous work in the sex industry8 or marrying a same-sex 
partner.9  However, encouraging social media use can benefit 
companies because of increased company exposure through 
employees’ posts, tweets, or other social media use. 
 
III. Overview of the Law’s Relationship to Employers, 
Employees, and Social Media 
 
With both technology and user behavior blurring the lines 
of acceptable and accepted social media use by individuals and 
companies, the law plays a confusing role in providing clarity. 
Some experts view the legal efforts to help solve the social 
media and employment conundrum as trying to reinterpret a 
 
media. 
8. See Eric Owens, Teacher Fired Just Because She Was a Stripper Gets 
$45,000 Settlement, THE DAILY CALLER (June 26, 2013), 
http://dailycaller.com/2013/06/26/teacher-fired-just-because-she-was-a-
stripper-gets-45000-settlement/; Lee Moran, Spanish High School Teacher 
Who Posed Naked for Playboy Is Fired, NY DAILY NEWS (Oct. 16, 2013), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/spanish-teacher-posed-naked-
playboy-fired-article-1.1487060; see also Tony Aiello, Ex-Stripper-Turned-
Teacher Petro Moves On, CBS N.Y. (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/02/10/former-stripper-turned-teacher-is-
moving-on-with-life/ (reporting that former Bronx elementary school art 
teacher was suspended for her previous work as an exotic dancer). 
9. See Carol Kuruvilla, Fired Gay Vice Principal Fighting Back Against 
Seattle-area Catholic School, NY DAILY NEWS (Mar. 8, 2014), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ousted-gay-vice-principal-
fighting-back-catholic-school-fired-article-1.1715326 (stating that the 
Catholic school gave an employee an ultimatum, either divorce his husband 
or be fired); Fired Gay Glendora Catholic Schoolteacher Sues St. Lucy’s 
Priory, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB. (Mar. 13, 2014), 
http://www.sgvtribune.com/social-affairs/20140313/fired-gay-glendora-
catholic-schoolteacher-sues-st-lucys-priory (reporting that a former Catholic 
teacher thinks he was fired after marrying his partner after same-sex 
marriage became legal in California); Clare Kim, Gay Teacher Fired After 
Applying for Marriage License, MSNBC (Dec. 9, 2013), 
http://www.msnbc.com/the-last-word/gay-teacher-fired-marriage-license 
(stating that a foreign language Catholic teacher was fired after he applied 
for a marriage license to wed his partner of 12 years). 
9
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continuum into a simple binary. Eric Goldman argues that 
 
the law assumes that social media accounts have 
only two states: personal or not-personal. 
Instead, social media accounts fit along a 
continuum where the endpoints are (1) 
completely personal, and (2) completely business-
related–but many employees’ social media 
accounts (narrowly construed, ignoring the 
statutory overbreadth problem) fit somewhere in 
between those two endpoints. Indeed, employers 
and employees routinely disagree about whether 
or not a social media account was personal or 
business-related.10 
 
However, attempting to use the creation date of a social 
media account as a dividing line between personal and 
professional use does not help. The usability functionality on 
several social media platforms such as Facebook, requires a 
business page to be tied to a personal account. If an employee is 
directed to create or use a social media account for their job, it 
is very likely to be tied to their personal social media account. 
Law and policymakers have come no closer to finding a 
clear solution to the issue. In a statement announcing the 
failed federal Social Networking Online Protection Act bill, 
Representative Eliot L. Engel said: 
 
The lack of clarity in the law puts individuals in 
a position where they either have to give up 
vital, private information, or risk losing their job, 
potential job, or enrollment in school and 
involvement in the school’s sports programs. 
Frankly, when there are no laws prohibiting 
institutions from requiring this information, it 
becomes a common practice. Social media sites 
 
10. Eric Goldman, Big Problems in California's New Law Restricting 
Employers' Access to Employees' Online Accounts, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2012, 
12:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/09/28/big-problems-
in-californias-new-law-restricting-employers-access-to-employees-online-
accounts/. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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have become a widespread communications tool – 
both personally and professionally – all across 
the world. It is erroneous to just say that if you 
don’t want your information accessed that you 
shouldn’t put it online.11 
 
While social media and online monitoring of individuals by 
federal or state government has, and should, be analyzed 
through a Fourth Amendment lens, our concern is not 
specifically with government or non-government intrusion into 
social media use by employees, but instead with the 
individual’s right to a private life and to represent themselves 
and their views publicly and independently outside of the 
workplace, regardless of employer. The following examples help 
to illustrate previous attempts to define the role of the law in 
determining the rights and responsibilities of an individual’s 
communication and self-expression via social media. 
 
A. United States Supreme Court 
 
In a 2010 case, City of Ontario v. Quon, the U.S. Supreme 
Court attempted to determine the privacy expectations of an 
employee. SWAT Officer Quon claimed that when his employer 
searched the personal text messages he sent from his 
employer-provided pager, it was a violation of his privacy. 
The Court did not want to make a premature legal rule 
regarding privacy and technology in the workplace, considering 
“[a]t present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and the 
law’s treatment of them, will evolve” regarding the interaction 
between these elements.12  Technology and norms are not 
static; instead “rapid changes in the dynamics of 
communication and information transmission are evident not 
just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as 
proper behavior.”13  The Court admitted having “difficulty 
 
11. Press Release, Eliot L. Engel, Reps. Engel, Schakowsky, Grimm Seek 
to Protect Online Content (Feb. 6, 2013), available at 
http://engel.house.gov/common/popup/popup.cfm?action=item.print&itemID=
3352. 
12. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010). 
13. Id. 
11
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predicting how employees’ privacy expectations will be shaped 
by those changes or the degree to which society will be 
prepared to recognize those expectations as reasonable.”14 
However, the Court stated that “employer policies concerning 
communications will of course shape the reasonable [privacy] 
expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that 
such policies are clearly communicated.”15 
Some commenters thought this case had larger policy 
implications, arguing that “the equalization of privacy rights in 
the public and private sector down to the [lower] level 
[provided to] the private sector is mistaken.”16  On the other 
hand, Eric Goldman stated that he did not “see how this case’s 
outcome has any implications for private-sector employees or 
employers.”17  We leave to others to determine whether Quon 
has direct implications for private sector employees, but there 
are other federal-level limitations on employer restrictions on 
employee use of social media. 
 
B. Federal Law 
 
Several government agencies have attempted to define the 
line between speech that represents an entire entity and 
speech that only represents that of individuals. The regulations 
range greatly in their scope – from the Federal Trade 
Commission’s (FTC) concern about transparency in 
advertising, to the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) 
concern about limits on union organizing by employers, to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) concern about 
business communications regarding regulated industries. 
 
 1.  Federal Trade Commission 
 
The Federal Trade Commission has attempted to define 
 
14. Id. at 759-60. 
15. Id. at 760. 
16. Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 277, 281 (2012). 
17. Ethan Ackerman, No Wrath in This Quon-Ontario v. Quon, TECH. & 
MARKETING. L. BLOG (June 20, 2010), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/06/no_wrath_in_thi.htm. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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the differentiation between an individual speaking 
independently or speaking on behalf of a corporate entity.  The 
Federal Trade Commission revised rules for Internet reviews in 
the FTC’s Guide Concerning the Use of Endorsements and 
Testimonials in Advertising (“the Guides”). The Guides are 
administrative interpretations of the law intended to help 
compliance with the Federal Trade Commission Act, but are 
not binding law themselves. 
The purpose of the Guides is to protect consumers by 
creating a line between paid and consumer endorsements.18 
When the FTC analyzes statements made via social media: 
 
The fundamental question is whether, viewed 
objectively, the relationship between the 
advertiser and the speaker is such that the 
speaker’s statement can be considered 
“sponsored” by the advertiser and therefore an 
“advertising message.” In other words, in 
disseminating positive statements about a 
product or service, is the speaker: (1) acting 
solely independently, in which case there is no 
endorsement, or (2) acting on behalf of the 
advertiser or its agent, such that the speaker’s 
statement is an “endorsement” that is part of an 
overall marketing campaign?19 
 
Therefore, to have a lawful social media policy under the 
FTC mandate, employees must disclose any connection to their 
employers, plus use a clear and conspicuous disclaimer. An 
employer’s social media policy must explain how to adhere to 
the FTC’s new standards if an employee is using social media 
to endorse an employer’s products or services.20 
However, the FTC also thinks that the possibility of an 
employee “going rogue” is not a concern, as indicated in the 
Guide: 
 
18. Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in 
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,124, 53,124 (Oct. 15, 2009) (codified at 16 C.F.R. 
§ 255). 
19. Id. at 53,126. 
20. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2009). 
13
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although the Commission has brought law 
enforcement actions against companies whose 
failure to establish or maintain appropriate 
internal procedures resulted in consumer injury, 
it is not aware of any instance in which an 
enforcement action was brought against a 
company for the actions of a single “rogue” 
employee who violated established company 
policy that adequately covered the conduct in 
question.21 
 
Therefore, according to the FTC, if an employer has a 
known policy by employees, the possibility of an employee’s 
actions on social media being used against the company in an 
action by the FTC is minimal. 
 
 2.  National Labor Relations Board 
 
Thoroughly discussing NLRB and its goal to prevent 
employers from limiting union organizing may seem like a step 
backwards; the NLRB’s role is structured through an 
industrial-era framework of workers’ rights and away from our 
present online era where unions are less relevant to the 
general population than they were in the 20th century. 
However, along with state laws limiting employer intrusion by 
requesting social media passwords, this federal government 
agency takes one of the most employee-protective approaches 
regarding separating personal (including union organizing) 
from the professional. Also, unlike the SEC (discussed infra), 
the NLRB’s charge effects the majority of American employees. 
Employees have increasingly been turning to social media 
platforms to publicly discuss their workplace, people at their 
workplace, and their work itself. For many, social media is 
added to earlier ways to engage in discussions about the 
workplace, like talking to others in person or on the phone. 
Social media interactions have been added to employer speech 
 
21. Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in 
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. at 53136. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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limiting policies that attempt to regulate what employees say, 
especially non-polite or harassing speech, disparagement of the 
company’s services or products, disclosure of sensitive 
information (such as trade secrets), and criticism of workplace 
management.  By enforcing these speech and social media 
policies against employees, some of these disciplinary actions 
made their way to the NLRB. 
But the NLRB restrictions as discussed below are still 
difficult for both employers and employees to decipher. The 
NLRB’s scope is focused not on what would be in the best 
interest of employees, but rather to ensure that the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which gives employees the right 
to “engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or mutual aid or protection” is not 
violated.22 
This article is not offering a critique of the NLRB, which is 
staying within the bounds of its administrative authority. 
Many other scholars do have critiques of the NLRB’s recent 
actions regarding social media policies.23  We are, however, of 
the opinion that law and policy makers have a narrow 
understanding of the range and scope of social media activities 
by Americans at work and at home.  But because the NLRB’s 
focus is on unionizing rather than the overall limitations of 
speech and behavior, it cannot improve social media policies for 
employees in a more global sense. 
The Office of the General Counsel for the NLRB has issued 
several reports of investigations involving both the use of social 
media and employers’ social and general media policies.  After 
an increasing number of NLRB cases related to social media 
emerged, the NLRB’s Acting General Counsel issued three 
reports during 2011 and 2012 outlining the NLRA’s application 
 
22. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2012). 
23. See Alexandra Hemenway, The NLRB and Social Media: Does the 
NLRB "Like" Employee Interests?, 38 J. CORP. L. 607 (2013); Christine Neylon 
O'Brien, The Top Ten NLRB Cases on Facebook Firings and Employer Social 
Media Policies, 92 OR. L. REV. 337 (2013); Robert Sprague & Abigail E. 
Fournier, Online Social Media and the End of the Employment-at-Will 
Doctrine, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 557 (2013); Rebecca Stang, I Get by with a Little 
Help from My "Friends": How the National Labor Relations Board 
Misunderstands Social Media, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 621 (2013). 
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to employee social media postings and employers’ policies.24 
Read together, the reports mean that employer social 
media policies should not be so broad as to limit protected 
activities, such as discussing wages or working conditions 
among employees.  Generally, the more vague and expansive 
an employer’s social media policy’s prohibitions regarding 
employee speech, the more likely they will be considered to be 
unlawfully overbroad.  However, if the comments by employees 
are personal gripes disconnected from group activity among 
employees they are generally not protected. In simpler terms, 
the closer the action is to workplace organizing, the greater 
likelihood that firing the employee would violate the Labor 
Relations Act.  But if the action is closer to simple griping, the 
greater the possibility that disciplinary action would be legal. 
On January 24, 2012, the Acting General Counsel issued a 
second report, clarifying the NLRB’s critique of general non-
specific policies, expanding the types of policy terms that are 
disliked because they had an impermissible effect, whether or 
not they were actually enforced, of chilling employees’ exercise 
rights.  Policy terms that are disfavored include those 
prohibiting disparaging or inappropriate comments, 
disrespectful conduct, or the disclosure of sensitive or 
confidential matters.25 
However, the report also included inconsistencies in 
establishing policy.  For example, a policy that instead of 
 
24. LAFE SOLOMON, ACTING GEN. COUNSEL, N.L.R.B. TO ALL REGIONAL 
DIRECTORS, OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE, AND RESIDENT OFFICERS, REPORT OF THE 
ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES, N.L.R.B. (2012), 
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd; 
LAFE SOLOMON, ACTING GEN. COUNSEL, N.L.R.B. TO ALL REGIONAL DIRECTORS, 
OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE, AND RESIDENT OFFICERS, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES, N.L.R.B. (2012), 
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45807d6567; 
LAFE SOLOMON, ACTING GEN. COUNSEL, N.L.R.B. TO ALL REGIONAL DIRECTORS, 
OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE, AND RESIDENT OFFICERS, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES, N.L.R.B.  (2011), 
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/acting-general-
counsel-releases-report-social-media-cases. 
25. LAFE E. SOLOMON, ACTING GEN. COUNSEL, ACTING GEN. COUNSEL, 
N.L.R.B. TO ALL REGIONAL DIRECTORS, OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE, AND RESIDENT 
OFFICERS, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL 
MEDIA CASES, N.L.R.B. (2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news/acting-
general-counsel-issues-second-social-media-report. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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prohibiting unfriendly language prohibits vulgar, obscene, 
threatening, or intimidating language and actions is 
acceptable, because prohibitions are sufficiently detailed. An 
overall restriction on disclosing personal or sensitive 
information, which could encompass working conditions, is not 
permitted.  However, a policy requiring employees to follow 
securities regulations and other laws that prohibit disclosing 
confidential or proprietary information is permissible.26 
Following the issuance of the first two reports in March 
2012, the Acting General Counsel stated that a specific 
company’s policy’s rule against disclosure of “confidential, non-
public information” was “so vague” that “without limiting 
language,” employees could view it as preventing them from 
engaging in legally protected activities.  The Acting General 
Counsel found, in one case, that even though Giant Foods had 
an interest in strongly protecting its trademarks, it could not 
forbid employees’ noncommercial use of the trademarks while 
engaging in NLRA related activities.  However, the policy’s 
requirement that employees “not defame” or “otherwise 
discredit” the company’s products or services, and that 
employees report others for violating the policy, was held to be 
lawful.27 
On May 30, 2012, the Acting General Counsel released its 
third report, focusing on employer policies, including approving 
policies that prohibit the disclosure of attorney-client privileged 
information and also require employees to respect copyright 
and other intellectual property laws.  The report examined 
employer policies, finding that Wal-Mart’s social media policy 
prohibiting “inappropriate postings that may include 
discriminatory remarks, harassment and threats of violence or 
similar inappropriate or unlawful conduct” was acceptable.28 
However, General Motors’ policy with similar wording was not 
 
26. Id. 
27. Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Associate General 
Counsel, N.L.R.B., Office of the General Counsel, to Wane Gold, Regional 
Director (March 21, 2012), available at http://op.bna.com/tpif.nsf/id/mlon-
99ykxz/$File/Giant%20Food.pdf. 
28. LAFE E. SOLOMON, ACTING GEN. COUNSEL, N.L.R.B. TO ALL REGIONAL 
DIRECTORS, OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE, AND RESIDENT OFFICERS, REPORT OF THE 
ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA, N.L.R.B. 20 (2012) 
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd. 
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acceptable: “We found unlawful the instruction that ‘offensive, 
demeaning, abusive or inappropriate remarks are as out of 
place online as they are offline.”29  This “provision proscribes a 
broad spectrum of communications that would include 
protected criticisms of the employer’s labor policies or 
treatment of employees.”30 
Within the May 2012 report, the NLRB found acceptable 
language in a policy stating that employees may not represent 
“any opinion or statement as the policy or view of the 
[Employer] or of any individual in their capacity as an 
employee or otherwise on behalf of the [Employer].”31  The 
policy language was viewed as acceptable because it referred to 
comments made from the perspective of the employer – not the 
employee.  Also found acceptable was policy language stating: 
“postings are ‘my own and do not represent [Employer’s] 
positions, strategies or opinions’ . . . . An employer has a 
legitimate need for a disclaimer to protect itself from 
unauthorized postings made to promote its product or 
services.”32 
 
 3.  Other Federal Agencies: Financial Institutions and 
Social Media 
 
However, one of the more interesting elements regarding 
social media communications in this area is actually not 
directly about employees, but about helping to create a good 
dividing line between personal and professional in other 
contexts.  The federal agencies that deal with financial 
institutions have the charge to make sure that those that work 
in these regulated industries behave appropriately regarding 
disclosing information that may impact investors.  The 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) require broker-
dealers and registered investment advisers to monitor 
employees’ use of social media, to ensure that employees do not 
 
29. Id. at 8. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 16. 
32. Id. at 17. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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harm investors through their use of social media.  Therefore, 
“[f]irms must adopt policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to ensure that their associated persons who 
participate in social media sites for business purposes are 
appropriately supervised . . . and do not present undue risks to 
investors.”33 
According to FINRA, the determination of what constitutes 
a business communication is solely based on its content.34  The 
determination regarding whether the communication relates to 
“business as such” does not depend on whether the 
communication was made on a personal or business account 
meaning that if someone is on their personal Facebook, 
Twitter, or other social media account they still need to be 
cautious about talking about work.35  The SEC also uses a 
content-based determination process,36 aware that social media 
has “landscape-shifting” possibilities; the SEC suggests 
“adopt[ing], and periodically review[ing] the effectiveness of, 
policies and procedures regarding social media in the face of 
rapidly changing technology.”37 
The combination of the present federal regulations and 
state laws causes issues for those in these regulated industries 
and some have suggested that the 
 
optimal resolution would be the creation of a 
 
33. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 10-06, SOCIAL MEDIA WEB SITES, 
GUIDANCE ON BLOGS AND SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES 7 (2010), available at 
https://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notic
es/p120779. 
34. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 11-39, SOCIAL MEDIA WEBSITES AND THE 
USE OF PERSONAL DEVICES FOR BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS, GUIDANCE ON 
SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES AND BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS 2-3 (2011), 
available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notice
s/p124186. 
35. Id. at 3. 
36. SEC Div. of Inv. Mgmt., IM Guidance Update, Filing Requirements 
for Certain Electronic Communications (2013), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/im-guidance-update-
filing-requirements-for-certain-electronic-communications.pdf. 
37. SEC Off. of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, National 
Examination Risk Alert, Investment Adviser Use of Social Media 1-2 (Jan. 4, 
2012), available at  http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/riskalert-
socialmedia.pdf. 
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single federal regime that defers to FINRA, the 
SEC and other financial regulatory authorities 
wherever conflicts exist. Such a regime could be 
accomplished through a federal social media 
privacy statute with clear language exempting 
the monitoring of personal social media accounts 
if companies are required to do so under 
applicable law, and pre-empting any conflicting 
laws, including the NLRA and state laws.38 
 
Creating a simplified regulatory regime where the default 
is privacy for social media accounts would help protect the 
interests of employees. Also, this default would better prompt 
the public to see statements from individuals on social media 
as reflecting only their own views rather than automatically as 
statements reflecting viewpoints of an employer. 
 
C. State Laws Related to Social Media Access by Employers or 
Educational Institutions 
 
Many states have enacted legislation this term regarding 
protecting social media accounts from prying eyes, whether 
from employers or educational institutions. However, some 
experts believe that all of the statutory solutions discussed do 
not address the proper issue involving intrusiveness into 
privacy. In a post entitled “The Spectacular Failure of 
Employee Social Media Privacy Laws,” Eric Goldman states 
that 
 
a decent policy objective–prevent[ing] employers 
from inappropriately demanding employees’ 
social media passwords–can be hard to convert 
into rigorous legislative drafting, especially in 
technology contexts. To me, the lesson is that if 
rigorous legislative drafting isn’t likely, maybe 
 
38. Richard J. Rabin et al., CATCH-22.COM: Conflicting Social Media 
Regulatory Regimes and the Impact on Financial Institutions, 03 SOC. MEDIA 
L. & POL’Y REP. (BNA) 9 (Mar. 2014), available at 
http://cdn.akingump.com/images/content/2/7/v2/27578/Catch-22-Article.pdf. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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the policy objective isn’t worth pursuing in the 
first place.39 
 
Most states have at least some legislation addressing social 
media and employees or higher education institutions (see 
Appendix infra).  On August 1, 2012, Illinois Governor Pat 
Quinn signed H.B. 3782 (Public Act 097-0875), effective on 
January 1, 2013.40  The new law amended the Right to Privacy 
in the Workplace Act,41 providing that it shall be unlawful for 
employers to ask prospective employees information related to 
their social networking websites in order to gain access to such 
accounts or profiles.42  This prohibition does not affect the 
usage or monitor the usage of the employers’ electronic 
equipment, nor affect employees’ information that can be 
obtained under other laws, such as information that is in the 
public domain.43 
Similarly, on September 27, 2012, California enacted social 
media privacy laws affecting employers and postsecondary 
educational institutions.44  One law prohibits employers from 
requiring or requesting social media related information from 
their employees or potential employees.45  It also prohibits 
employers from retaliating against an employee or applicant 
for not complying with a request or demand by a violating 
employer.46  The other California law prohibits employees and 
 
39. Eric Goldman, The Spectacular Failure of Employee Social Media 
Privacy Laws, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (May 31, 2014). 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/05/state_laws_to_p.htm. 
40. H.B. 3782, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012). 
41. ILL. PUB. ACT. 097-0875 (2012); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/10 (2013). 
42. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/10(b)(1) (provides that it shall be unlawful 
for any employer to ask any prospective employee to provide any username, 
password, or other related account information in order to gain access to a 
social networking website where that prospective employee maintains an 
account or profile); see also Ill. H.B. 3782. 
43. 820 ILL COMP. STAT. 55/10(b)(2-3). 
44. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2014); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 99120-99122 
(West 2014). 
45. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(b); see also id. § 980(c)-(d) (these specify 
that section 980 does not affect “employer’s existing rights and obligations to 
request an employee to divulge personal social media reasonably believe to be 
relevant to an investigation of allegations of employee misconduct or violation 
[of laws]”  or “accessing an employer-issued electronic device”). 
46. Id. § 980(e). 
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representatives of public and private postsecondary 
educational institutions from requiring social media disclosure 
from their students, prospective students, or student groups.47 
It also requires that institutions ensure compliance with these 
provisions and post the social media privacy policy on their web 
site.48 
 
IV.   Contracts: Employment Contracts and Sponsorship Deals 
 
The issue of employers and educational institutions asking 
for access to social media passwords is slowly being addressed 
by state legislatures.  However, there are still several 
important trends within case law related to the interaction of 
social media and employment.  One thread of this trend relates 
to the confusion that exists when an individual is the sole 
representative or social media “voice” to promote the services 
or work of an employer, or when an individual willingly shares 
personal social media profile information to an employer. 
Another thread relates to whose “voice” is speaking – whether 
it is that of the individual employee or of the employer as a 
whole. 
 
A.  Employment Cases 
 
The cases we discuss below address varied litigated issues 
between employers and employees regarding social media 
accounts. Two cases, PhoneDog v. Kravitz,49 discussed infra, 
and Eagle v. Morgan,50 have been previously analyzed in law 
 
47. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99121(a)-(b); see also id. § 99121(c) (provides 
exceptions similar to the ones provided in CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(c)). 
48. Id. § 99121. 
49. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11–03474 MEJ, 2012 WL 273323 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 30, 2012). 
50. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11–4303, 2011 WL 6739448 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 
2011).  In this case, it is not an employee who is accused of misusing the 
social media account of the employer, but rather the employer who is accused 
of incorrectly using the social media account of a former employee.  Eagle v. 
Morgan, No. C 11–4303, 2012 WL 4739436 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012) (citing 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Interrogatories 
No. 2).  LinkedIn is generally viewed as a platform that bridges the divide 
between personal and professional information.  It is intended for individuals 
to connect professionally with others, but also requires people to mention 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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review articles, either discussing the issues generally51 or 
specifically regarding trade secret issues.52  Additionally, there 
 
their present and former positions and employers.  Eagle created her 
LinkedIn account while at the employer, but the information in the profile 
was information about herself rather than specifically about work for her 
employer.  Eagle was locked out of her LinkedIn page for two weeks by her 
former employer, possibly because during her time of employment she had 
provided her LinkedIn password to other employees that were assisting her 
with using the account.  Id. (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint).  After her 
termination, continuing employees with access to her account, continued to 
use the account and also locked her out of it, by changing the password.  Id. 
(citing Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to 
Interrogations No. 2).  The employer, Educomm, saw Eagle’s page as a 
corporate asset, rather than as a personal page, changing the password, and 
scooping out Eagle’s information and swapping in information about another 
employee.  Eagle v. Morgan, No. C 11–4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 12, 2013); see Linda Eagle LinkedIn Page, LINKEDIN, 
linkedin.com/in/lindaeagle (last visited Dec. 22, 2014).  This meant that those 
looking for Linda Eagle on LinkedIn would only find the Morgan information 
Eagle page.  Id.  Eagle argued that the LinkedIn page was a corporate asset 
rather than a personal page, despite the terms of service for LinkedIn, which 
limit sharing of passwords with others.  User Agreement, LINKEDIN (Mar. 26, 
2014), http://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement.  In the end, despite the 
court finding that Eagle proved several of her claims, including unauthorized 
use of name, invasion of privacy/misappropriation of identity and 
misappropriation of publicity, she lost because she encountered no economic 
damages. 
51. See Kyle-Beth Hilfer, Minimizing Legal Risks for Clients Using 
Social Media to Advertise and Market Their Brands, 38 WESTCHESTER B.J. 35 
(2012); Robert J. Kolansky, Can We Really Ascribe a Dollar Amount to 
Interpersonal Communication? How Phonedog v. Kravitz May Decide Who 
Owns A Twitter Account, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 133 (2013); 
Agnieszka A. Mcpeak, The Facebook Digital Footprint: Paving Fair and 
Consistent Pathways to Civil Discovery of Social Media Data, 48 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 887 (2013); Adam S. Nelson, Tweet Me Fairly: Finding 
Attribution Rights Through Fair Use in the Twittersphere, 22 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 697 (2012); Bethany N. Whitfield, Social 
Media @ Work: #Policyneeded, 66 ARK. L. REV. 843 (2013). 
52. See David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are 
Increasingly Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091 (2012); Zoe Argento, 
Whose Social Network Account? A Trade Secret Approach to Allocating 
Rights, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 201 (2013); Francois Quintin 
Cilliers, The Role and Effect of Social Media in the Workplace, 40 N. KY. L. 
REV. 567 (2013); Hope A. Comisky & Tracey E. Diamond, The Risks and 
Rewards of a Byod Program: Ensuring Corporate Compliance Without 
Causing “Bring Your Own Disaster” at Work, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 385 
(2014); Stephen McJohn, Top Tens in 2011: Copyright and Trade Secret 
Cases, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 331 (2012); Tiffany A. Miao, Access 
Denied: How Social Media Accounts Fall Outside the Scope of Intellectual 
Property Law and Into the Realm of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 23 
23
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are several other litigated cases, such as Artis Health, LLC v. 
Nankivell, that are not discussed in this article.53  The 
following cases are not clear-cut about the line between an 
employer’s social media presence and the employee’s social 
media presence, due to both technological issues and user 
activity. 
 
1.  PhoneDog v. Kravitz 
 
In PhoneDog v. Kravitz, a person working as the social 
media “voice” of a company claimed ownership over a social 
media account used by him, and only him, as the user.54  In 
April 2006, Noah Kravitz started working at PhoneDog.com, a 
news and review site, where his job duties required him to 
regularly serve as the social media presence of the company, 
tweeting using the Twitter name @PhoneDogNoah.55  During 
Kravitz’s employment with PhoneDog, the @PhoneDogNoah 
amassed almost 17,000 Twitter followers.56  He became a 
contributor to CNBC and Fox shows, where his employer was 
 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017 (2013). 
53. While not the only issue at dispute between the parties, the part of 
the case related to employment and social media relates to an employee 
leaving without giving back passwords, but due to the written agreement 
regarding ownership of the accounts, the former employee lost.  Artis Health, 
LLC v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013, 2012 WL 5290326, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 
23, 2012).  Nenkivell worked for Curb Your Cravings, LLC (“CYC”) as a 
“video and social media producer,” where her work included producing videos, 
websites, blogs, and social media pages for CYC and the other two plaintiffs.  
Her responsibilities included maintaining passwords and other login 
information for websites, email accounts, and social media accounts.”  Id. at 
*1.  In response to a claim for injunctive relief, the court states that because 
Nenkivell retained passwords, the plaintiffs have a claim of conversion that 
can move forward, and that plaintiffs’ inability to access and update their site 
constitutes irreparable harm.  Id. at *3.  This case differs from the other 
cases discussed because there is an agreement between the parties regarding 
ownership of the accounts – but also that the accounts do not appear to be 
taken over by the former employee, instead she was just holding on to the 
passwords.  In this case, the voice of the social media accounts was intended 
by all parties to be of the employer, so it makes sense that the former 
employee would not be allowed to hold on to the social media presence built 
while employed. 
54. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11–03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). 
55. Id. at *1. 
56. Id. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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listed as Phonedog.57  In October 2010, Kravitz’s employment 
with PhoneDog ended; PhoneDog requested that Kravitz turn 
control of the Twitter account over to the company.58  Based on 
these facts, it seems like PhoneDog did not have any 
alternative users of the account, a situation that is not usual 
for present day corporate Twitter accounts, but was more 
common four years ago. 
Kravitz had changed the Twitter handle to reflect his own 
name – @noahkravitz and continued to post regularly, 
promoting the products of his new employer.59  He claimed that 
the Twitter name change removing PhoneDog from “his” 
Twitter name was with their knowledge; it claimed otherwise.60 
PhoneDog sued Kravitz for misappropriation of trade secrets, 
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, 
negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, 
and conversion.61  The court’s initial order dismissed 
PhoneDog’s claims for negligent and intentional interference 
with economic relationships, but did not dismiss PhoneDog’s 
claims for conversion and misappropriation of trade secrets.62 
In its amended complaint, PhoneDog claimed that it had 
an economic relationship with the followers of Kravitz’s Twitter 
account, so Kravitz taking over the account disrupted the 
“relationship.”63  Also, PhoneDog argued that by continuing to 
appear on CNBC and Fox News while not being employed by 
them, Kravitz interfered with its economic relationship with 
these channels.64  The economic relationship that PhoneDog 
had with the Twitter followers of the account was created 
through Kravitz’s actions. 
 
57. Counterclaims and Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, ¶ 
24, PhoneDog v. Kravitz (No. 11-cv-0347), 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
8, 2011). 
58. PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1. 
59. Counterclaims and Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, ¶ 
22, PhoneDog v. Kravitz (No. 11-cv-0347), 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
8, 2011). 
60. Id. at ¶ 20. 
61. PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1. 
62. Id. 
63. First Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, ¶ 35-
36, PhoneDog v. Kravitz (No. 11-cv-0347), 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
8, 2011). 
64. Id. 
25
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In the initial order, the court stated that PhoneDog 
successfully pleaded negligence by alleging “Kravitz owed a 
duty of care to PhoneDog as an agent of PhoneDog.”65  The 
court did not address the issue of how long after employment 
ends does the duty as an agent continue.  After a year and a 
half after filing, the case settled.66 
In this case, Kravitz did create the Twitter account while 
working for PhoneDog and most of the tweets were about 
PhoneDog.  While PhoneDog claims that the Twitter followers 
were as a result of relationship building, what is not 
acknowledged is that Kravitz was the singular catalyst for 
those relationships in the first place.  Additionally, the use of 
Kravitz name within PhoneDog’s Twitter name implies that 
those who follow the feed could potentially be interested in 
either content about PhoneDog or the content specifically 
created by Kravitz.  That is to say, there is the possibility that 
Kravitz, rather than PhoneDog, may have been the primary 
draw for followers.  This possibility is not acknowledged. 
Kravitz’s identity, including his persona and his image, 
was part of his work for PhoneDog, and the argument 
PhoneDog made regarding how their former spokesperson 
should not be allowed to participate on traditional media, such 
as Fox News, would be considered by almost anyone as a 
laughable one in other industries.  After all, television pundits 
and commentators change their employment status frequently 
without it compromising the reputation of former employers. 
PhoneDog’s argument regarding the Twitter account is 
analogous, considering that the account was in the “voice” of 
Kravitz. 
In this case, most of the Tweets on the account were about 
technology rather than personal interactions with friends and 
family.  However, the interactivity of Twitter does not separate 
the range of communications between professional and 
personal easily.  But what if the account preceded employment 
by the company and then he wanted to leave with the account? 
Considering how social media accounts are actually used, the 
 
65. PhoneDog, 2012 WL 273323, at *1 (citing Plaintiff’s First Amended 
Complaint). 
66. PhoneDog, LLC, v. Kravitz, No. 3:11-cv-03474-MEJ, 2013 WL 
207773 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013). 
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threads between personal and professional can became 
impossibly tangled, even if the stated purpose of the account is 
personal – not professional. 
 
2.  Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group, Ltd. 
 
In Maremont, the employer used an employee’s personally 
identified social media account for marketing purposes, 
speaking as the “voice” of the employee. In this case, we see the 
difficulty in drawing a clear line between employer and 
employee social media communications when technical 
functionality does not make such a distinction easy to execute. 
Maremont worked as an interior designer working for Susan 
Fredman Design Group (SFDG) as SFDG’s Director of 
Marketing, Public Relations, and e-commerce.67  Maremont had 
a personal Twitter (@jmaremont) and Facebook accounts that 
were nevertheless tied to her career and work,68 where there 
did not appear to be a clear delineation between the two. 
Maremont also created a SFDG sub-blog “Designer Diaries: 
Tales from the Interior” hosted on SFDG’s main blog.69 
Maremont’s image appeared on each blogpost and tweet 
authored by her.70 
As the court discusses, the difficulty in determining what 
was personal and what was related to her job is also based on 
the technological means of using social media: 
 
Maremont created a Facebook page for SFDG at 
Fredman’s request.  Maremont opened SFDG’s 
Facebook page through her personal Facebook 
account on February 17, 2009.  In order to 
administer SFDG’s page, the page administrator 
had to log on through his or her personal 
Facebook account.71 
 
67. Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 2d 967, 
969 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
68. Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., Ltd., No. 10 C 7811, 2014 
WL 812401, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014). 
69. Maremont, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 969. 
70. Id. 
71. Maremont, 2014 WL 812401, at *2. 
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Access to Maremont-named account passwords 
became an issue between the parties: 
 
To keep track of the various social media 
campaigns she was conducting for SFDG, 
Maremont created an electronic spreadsheet in 
which she stored all account access information, 
including the passwords for her Twitter and 
Facebook accounts. . . . Laurice Shelven, an 
intern at SFDG from September 8, 2009 to 
December 30, 2009, states that Maremont 
provided her with the spreadsheet so she could 
assist Maremont in composing and publishing 
posts for the various SFDG social media 
campaigns.72 
 
In September 2009, Maremont was severely injured and 
was in the hospital for an extended stay.73  While Maremont 
was at the hospital, SFDG continued to access and post from 
the personal accounts of Maremont.74  All of the posts and 
tweets showed Maremont’s name and image, meaning that any 
followers would have the erroneous impression that Maremont 
was the author.  Maremont asked SFDG to stop using her 
account.  Because SFDG did not stop using her account, 
Maremont changed the passwords to her personal Facebook 
and Twitter accounts.75 
Maremont was very close to bringing her Lanham claim to 
a jury, considering the court found that “the Twitter account 
was in Maremont’s name, not SFDG’s, and it would be 
reasonable to conclude that posts made on that account were 
made by Maremont herself.”76  But because Maremont did not 
claim any actual economic damages, a requirement for Lanham 
claims, her former employer won their summary judgment 
 
72. Id. 
73. Maremont, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 969. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Maremont, 2014 WL 812401, at *5. 
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motion on this issue.77  However, her claim for a violation of the 
Stored Communications Act was allowed to continue, 
considering there was an issue that could not be determined by 
summary judgment: “Defendants admit that they accessed 
Maremont’s Facebook account and posted Tweets to 
Maremont’s Twitter account. The parties dispute whether 
Defendants’ actions were authorized or exceeded the scope of 
Maremont’s authorization.”78 
From the viewpoint of the employer, the use of the 
personal accounts was to only keep the social media presence of 
the company active during Maremont’s injury.  But from the 
perspective of the employee, prying into her personal accounts 
– even if she gave the passwords to others was a step too far in 
intruding into her personal life. 
 
B.  Sponsorship Deals: Mendendall v. Hanesbrands, Inc. 
 
Another way to look at the issue of what types of 
limitations employers should have over the social media 
interactions of employees relates to the moral rights clauses 
included in brand sponsorship agreements.  To enter into these 
agreements, entertainers, including professional athletes, have 
the opportunity to consult with attorneys and other 
representatives putting their interests first.  The money gained 
through these deals is not their sole source of income – thereby 
allowing for the type of contracting most employees do not 
receive.  In contrast to “at-will” employment or contracts of 
adhesion, these contracts when containing morals clauses, 
including limitations on the use of social media, are entered 
into with full knowledge of the consequences.  Additionally, 
public figures can be sought out by brands specifically for their 
personas which is not generally the reason why average 
employees are hired. 
Therefore, looking at a case where a brand sponsor took 
action against an athlete’s “bad actions” on social media helps 
to demonstrate how those with more contracting ability than 
the vast majority of employees can speak openly – even if they 
 
77. Id. at 4-5. 
78. Id. at 6. 
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have a branding agreement that says otherwise.  On July 18, 
2011, NFL’s Pittsburgh Steelers player, Rashard Mendenhall, 
sued Hanesbrands, Inc. claiming that Hanesbrands breached 
their talent agreement by terminating his exclusive 
endorsement contract based on several controversial tweets 
from his twitter account, @R_Mendendall.79  Mendenhall used 
Twitter “to be himself, to express his opinions and [to] foster 
debate on controversial and non-controversial issues.”80 
Hanesbrands had not taken any steps against previous 
potential polarizing tweets, but did act to terminate the 
contract a week after Mendenhall issued a series of tweets in 
May 2011 concerning the public celebrations of Osama bin 
Laden’s death.81  His tweets included: 
 
What kind of person celebrates death? It’s 
amazing how people can HATE a man they never 
even heard speak. We’ve only heard one side . . . 
. . . . 
For those of you who said we want to see Bin 
Laden burn in hell and piss on his ashes, I ask 
how would God feel about your heart? 
There is not an ignorant bone in my body. I just 
encourage you to #think 
@dkller23 We’ll never know what really 
happened. I just have a hard time believing a 
plane could take a skyscraper down demolition 
style.82 
 
The termination was based on the morals clause of 
Mendenhall’s contract: 
 
If Mendenhall commits or is arrested for any 
crime or becomes involved in any situation or 
occurrence . . . tending to bring Mendenhall into 
 
79.  Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 
2012). 
80. Id. at 720. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
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public disrepute, contempt, scandal or ridicule, or 
tending to shock, insult or offend the majority of 
the consuming public or any protected class or 
group thereof, then we shall have the right to 
immediately terminate this Agreement. 
[Hanesbrands’] decision on all matters arising 
under this Section . . . shall be conclusive.83 
 
In a public statement, Hanesbrands elaborated on its 
position regarding their view of the breach of the morals 
clause: 
 
Champion is a strong supporter of the 
government’s efforts to fight terrorism and is 
very appreciative of the dedication and 
commitment of the U.S. Armed Forces. Earlier 
this week, Rashard Mendenhall, who endorses 
Champion products, expressed personal 
comments and opinions regarding Osama bin 
Laden and the September 11 terrorist attacks 
that were inconsistent with the values of the 
Champion brand and with which we strongly 
disagreed. . . . Champion was obligated to 
conduct a business assessment to determine 
whether Mr. Mendenhall could continue to 
effectively communicate on behalf of and 
represent Champion with consumers. 
While we respect Mr. Mendenhall’s right to 
express sincere thoughts regarding potentially 
controversial topics, we no longer believe that 
Mr. Mendenhall can appropriately represent 
Champion and we have notified Mr. Mendenhall 
that we are ending our business relationship.84 
 
Mendenhall also released a blog post following his tweets 
where he said: 
 
 
83. Id. at 725. 
84. Id. at 721-22. 
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This controversial statement was something I 
said in response to the amount of joy I saw in the 
event of a murder. I don’t believe that this is an 
issue of politics or American pride; but one of 
religion, morality, and human ethics. . . . I 
apologize for the timing as such a sensitive 
matter, but it was not meant to do harm. I 
apologize to anyone I unintentionally harmed 
with anything that I said, or any hurtful 
interpretation that was made and put in my 
name. 
It was only meant to encourage anyone reading it 
to think.85 
 
Hanesbrand viewed these tweets as causing a public 
scandal – and thereby Mendenhall was in breach of the 
contract. However, applying New York law to the Hanesbrands’ 
motion for judgment as a matter of law, Chief District Judge 
James A. Beaty concluded that issues of fact remained 
regarding the public’s response to the tweets and the reasoning 
of the contract termination.86  Because the evidence presented 
was contradictory (supportive tweets presented by Mendenhall 
and negative news reports submitted by Hanesbrands), the 
case could not be resolved on a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.87 
Additionally, Steelers President Art Rooney II released a 
statement regarding Mendenhall’s tweets: 
 
I have not spoken with Rashard, so it is hard to 
explain or even comprehend what he meant with 
his recent Twitter comments. The entire Steelers 
organization is very proud of the job our military 
personnel have done and we can only hope this 
leads to our troops coming home soon.88 
 
 
85. Id. at 721. 
86. Id. at 727. 
87. Id. at 728. 
88. Rashard Mendenhall Doesn’t Hold Back, ESPN (May 4, 2011, 9:57 
AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=6471433. 
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However, Mendenhall received no punishment from the 
Steelers organization or the NFL based on his tweets. The case 
was reported settled at mediation in December 2012.89 
 
V.  Student Athletes 
 
Professional athletes may have limitations on their social 
media use placed on them by either the brands they contract 
with for sponsorship or by their teams, but these limitations 
are contracted.  On the other hand, there have been a number 
of discussions about how student athletes have much more 
limited personal autonomy than either the general student 
population or professional athletes. Another limitation placed 
on student athletes that distances them from their peers are 
partial or complete bans on student athlete use of social media.  
Some law review articles have argued that these restrictions go 
too far,90 though not all follow that viewpoint.91 Based on the 
NLRB ruling (discussed infra) regarding student athletes, it is 
possible that students will be doubly protected both by this 
ruling and by state-specific social media password laws, if they 
are indeed considered both students and employees. 
Student athletes, like most college students in their late-
teens and early twenties, are in the process of figuring out who 
they are – and part of the learning process for many is 
communicating and socializing using social media. As danah 
 
89. See Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 
2012) (more specifically, the docket, No. 1:11CV00570, which presents the 
case settled in December of 2012). 
90. See J. Wes Gay, Hands Off Twitter: Are NCAA Student-Athlete Social 
Media Bans Unconstitutional?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 804 (2012) (“Under 
either the Tinker substantial disruption test or a narrowly tailored test, these 
team-wide and season-long social media bans are likely violations of the 
student-athletes' First Amendment speech rights.”); Marcus Hauer, The 
Constitutionality of Public University Bans of Student-Athlete Speech 
Through Social Media, 37 VT. L. REV. 413 (2012); Frank D. LoMonte, Fouling 
the First Amendment: Why Colleges Can't, and Shouldn't, Control Student 
Athletes' Speech on Social Media, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1 (2014); Kayleigh R. 
Mayer, Colleges and Universities All Atwitter: Constitutional Implications of 
Regulating and Monitoring Student-Athletes' Twitter Usage, 23 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 455, 468 (2013). 
91. Elizabeth Etherton, Seen but Not Heard: Constitutional Questions 
Surrounding Social Media Policies Affecting Student-Athletes, 11 
WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 41 (2014). 
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boyd discusses in the book, It’s Complicated: The Social Lives of 
Networked Teens, teens and young adults learn through 
interacting with others on social media and through creating 
their identities.92  An absolutist rule that restricts the use of 
social media prevents student athletes from learning how to 
use social media responsibly.  Moreover, many of the 
restrictions for student athletes are based around banning the 
usage of specific inflammatory words.93  The focus on specific 
words leaves out the overall responsible use of social media, or 
more specifically about behavior, interaction with others, or 
appropriate topics of conversation.  Finally, the limitations are 
established under the working assumption that an individual 
student athlete is communicating on behalf of the university, or 
as a representative of a university, not as a private citizen.94 
The focus of many of these regulations is on the impact on 
the school’s brand rather than on the education of students. 
Some critics, such as Zak Brown, detail the focus on the brand, 
but also the difficulties in balancing speech rights and 
potential damage to the brand: 
 
Allowing a student-athlete to voice somewhat 
controversial political or academic views on 
 
92. See generally DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF 
NETWORKED TEENS (2014). 
93. Jack Dickey, Don't Say "Colt 45" or "Pearl Necklace": How To Avoid 
Being Busted By The Facebook Cops of College Sports, DEADSPIN (May 24, 
2012), http://deadspin.com/5912230/dont-say-colt-45-or-pearl-necklace-how-
to-avoid-being-busted-by-the-facebook-cops-of-college-sports; Jack Dickey, 
"Ass Ranger" To "Zoomies": The Complete List Of Things College Athletes 
Can't Say on Social Media, DEADSPIN (May 24, 2012), 
http://deadspin.com/5912832/ass-ranger-to-zoomies-heres-the-complete-list-
of-what-college-athletes-shouldnt-say-on-twitter; Pete Thamel, Tracking 
Twitter, Raising Red Flags, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 2012. at D1 (A social 
media tracking company for college teams uses “a computer application that 
searches social media sites that athletes frequent, looking for obscenities, 
offensive commentary or words like “free,” which could indicate that a player 
has accepted a gift in violation of N.C.A.A. rules. … A company executive 
says these programs ‘look for things that could damage the school’s brand’”).  
94. Kayleigh R. Mayer, Colleges and Universities All Atwitter: 
Constitutional Implications of Regulating and Monitoring Student-Athletes' 
Twitter Usage, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 455, 468 (2013) (“Student-athletes 
are still students; therefore, if only the student-athletes are subject to 
regulations and penalties for using Twitter and the rest of the student body is 
not, then the schools may not be treating those similarly situated alike.”). 
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Twitter or Facebook would be preferable to a 
First Amendment suit that could result in far 
worse press and litigation costs. If the student-
athlete’s statement is truly egregious and 
damaging to the program, it is likely that it 
would either reasonably be perceived to bear the 
imprimatur of the school or cause substantial 
disruption on campus. . . . But punishing speech 
because of a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort 
and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint” would be a questionable 
decision.95 
 
Eric D. Bentley, the Senior Assistant General Counsel for 
the University of Houston System, has written a law review 
article that gives practical advice regarding social media 
policies for athletes from an institutional perspective including 
the following best practices: 
 
Best Practice Tip #1: Do Not Ban Athletes’ Use of 
Social Media 
. . . . 
Best Practice Tip #2: Place Reasonable 
Restrictions on the Use of Social Media and then 
Educate the Athletes on the Dangers [and] 
. . . . 
Best Practice Tip #3: Evaluate the Content of 
Social Media Postings on a Case by Case Basis 
and with Extreme Caution.96 
 
Most of the limitations suggested by Bentley fall within 
the types of restrictions that would be used for any student or 
employee acting as a public representative of an institution - 
 
95. Zak Brown, Note, What's Said in This Locker Room, Stays in This 
Locker Room: Restricting the Social Media Use of Collegiate Athletes and the 
Implications for Their Institutions, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 421, 442 
(2012). 
96. Eric D. Bentley, He Tweeted What? A First Amendment Analysis of 
the Use of Social Media by College Athletes and Recommended Best Practices 
for Athletic Departments, 38 J.C. & U.L. 451, 458-62 (2012). 
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not just on social media.  He suggests that an athlete can be 
disciplined based on the content of the posting, only within 
very specific categories, including for fighting words/true 
threats; defamatory statements; and postings that  indicate 
violations of criminal law.97  For potentially unprotected 
speech, an athlete can be disciplined based on the content of 
the posting after a detailed review of multiple factors, for 
engaging in harassing speech, or materially disruptive 
speech.98  Bentley’s only two categories that would not 
generally be covered by other types of student or employee 
limitations are obscenity and violations of “reasonable” team 
rules or NCAA rules.99 
The issue of what exactly student athletes are legally – 
just students, players who happen to be students, employees, 
or some combination – has moved to the forefront recently.  On 
March 26, 2014, Regional Director of the NLRB, Peter Sung 
Ohr, issued Decision 13-RC-121359, finding that Northwestern 
football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships are 
employees under the NLRA.100  The decision by the Regional 
Director is not one based on whether student athletes are 
employees within a larger picture regarding ethical issues, 
such as potential exploitation of students, or whether it is best 
for players to be considered employees over students.  The post-
hearing Brief of the College Athletes Players Association in the 
case demonstrates how student athletes’ interactions with the 
public, including social media, are limited by Northwestern: 
 
Players are required to make media appearances 
as directed by the University. The Players are 
also subject to a social media policy, separate 
from the policy applicable to students, which is 
enforced by the Athletic Department. . . . 
Violations of this policy can result in dismissal 
from the football program and loss of the Player’s 
 
97. Id. at 463-67. 
98. Id. at 469-73. 
99. Id. at 466-69. 
100. Nw. Univ. v. Employer & Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n, 2014 
N.L.R.B. Lexis 221 (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4581667b6f. 
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athletic scholarship. . . . Players must give access 
to their Facebook and Twitter accounts to 
coaches who monitor what the Players say or 
post online. . . . The Players are prohibited from 
using certain swear words . . . and can be 
suspended if they “embarrass [the] team” [sic] . . 
. . The University also prohibits a Player from 
providing any media interview unless arranged 
by the Athletic Department communications 
staff.101 
 
Instead of making a decision based on political grounds or 
the larger social implications, the decision follows the usual 
NLRB checklist regarding whether players statutorily behave 
as employees.  In the Northwestern case, the players are 
considered employees because they perform monetarily 
valuable services for a revenue-generating university sports 
program.  The student athletes are recruited for and granted 
scholarships because of their skills in football rather than 
academics, and receive scholarships as compensation for their 
athletic services.  They are required to sign agreements that 
serve as an employment contract with detailed information 
regarding length-of and conditions-for receiving compensation 
and are dependent on their scholarships to pay for basic 
necessities (considering they are limited regarding outside 
employment).  These student athletes’ scholarships are tied to 
their actions as football players; their scholarships may be 
immediately canceled if team rules are violated.102  Much of the 
Northwestern decision concerned the complete picture of the 
controlled lives of athletes, whom “nearly every aspect of the 
players’ private lives” is controlled including where they live, 
any employment, off-campus travel, and interaction with the 
larger world, including social media posts and dealings with 
media.103  At the time of publication, this decision is being 
 
101. Post-Hearing Brief of the Petitioner, Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 
Nw. Univ. v, Employer & Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n, 13-RC-121359, 2014 
WL 1922054 (Mar. 17, 2014) (citations omitted). 
102. Nw. Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. Lexis 221. 
103. Id. at 16. 
37
  
2014 HERE WE ARE NOW, ENTERTAIN US 435 
appealed.104 
The NLRB decision included discussions about social 
media activity, reworking the language from the post-hearing 
brief almost exactly: 
 
The players must also abide by a social media 
policy, which restricts what they can post on the 
internet, including Twitter, Facebook, and 
Instagram. In fact, the players are prohibited 
from denying a coach’s “friend” request and the 
former’s postings are monitored. The Employer 
prohibits players from giving media interviews 
unless they are directed to participate in 
interviews that are arranged by the Athletic 
Department. Players are prohibited from 
 
104. Nw. Univ. v. Employer & Coll. Athletics Players Ass'n, 2014 WL 
1653118, at *1 (Apr. 24, 2014) (review granted); Nw. Univ. v. Employer & 
Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n, 13-RC-121359, 2014 WL 1881179, at *1  (May 
12, 2014) (Notice and invitation to file briefs, asks Briefs to answer the 
following questions: “1. What test should the Board apply to determine 
whether grant-in-aid scholarship football players are “employees” within the 
meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act, and what is the proper result here, 
applying the appropriate test? 2. Insofar as the Board's decision in Brown 
University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004), may be applicable to this case, should the 
Board adhere to, modify, or overrule the test of employee status applied in 
that case, and if so, on what basis? 3. What policy considerations are relevant 
to the Board's determination of whether grant-in-aid scholarship football 
players are ‘employees’ within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act and 
what result do they suggest here? 4. To what extent, if any, is the existence or 
absence of determinations regarding employee status of grant-in-aid 
scholarship football players under other federal or state statutes or 
regulations relevant to whether such players are ‘employees’ under the Act? 
5. To what extent are the employment discrimination provisions of Title VII, 
in comparison to the antidiscrimination provisions of Title IX of the 
Education Amendments Act of 1972, relevant to whether grant-in-aid 
scholarship football players are ‘employees’ under the Act? 6. If grant-in-aid 
scholarship football players are ‘employees’ under the Act, to what extent, if 
any, should the Board consider, in determining the parties' collective-
bargaining obligations, the existence of outside constraints that may alter the 
ability of the parties to engage in collective bargaining as to certain terms 
and conditions of employment? What, if any, should be the impact of such 
constraints on the parties' bargaining obligations? In the alternative, should 
the Board recognize grant-in-aid scholarship football players as ‘employees’ 
under the Act, but preclude them from being represented in any bargaining 
unit or engaging in any collective bargaining, as is the case with confidential 
employees under Board law?”). 
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swearing in public, and if a player “embarrasses” 
the team, he can be suspended for one game. A 
second offense of this nature can result in a 
suspension of up to one year.105 
 
It is unclear whether this ruling will stand. However, even 
if the national NLRB overturns this decision, the fact that 
student athletes generally face more regulations of social 
media than other students and non-student athlete employees 
has now officially been noted. Some commentators have begun 
to theorize solutions benefiting student athletes, assuming that 
the ruling stands.106 
 
VI. The Next Battleground 
 
After student-athletes, the professoriate is the next 
category of employees whose jobs are affected by a blurred line 
between the personal and professional use of social media. The 
Kansas Board of Regents recently revised its university 
personnel policies making improper use of social media 
grounds for discipline up to and including termination for both 
faculty and staff. 107  Social media is defined as “any online tool 
or service through which virtual communities are created 
allowing users to publish commentary and other content, 
including but not limited to blogs, wikis, and social networking 
sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Flickr, and 
YouTube” – those that still use email and listservs will be glad 
to hear the policy does not apply to them.108 
The policy does have a First Amendment saving clause, 
“recogniz[ing] the First Amendment rights as well as the 
responsibilities of all employees, including faculty and staff, to 
 
105. Nw. Univ. v. Employer & Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n, 13-RC-
121359, 198 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1837 (N.L.R.B.), 2014 WL 1246914, 2014 
N.L.R.B. Lexis 221 (Mar. 26, 2014). 
106. See M. Tyler Brown, College Athletics Internships: The Case for 
Academic Credit in College Athletics, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1855 (2014). 
107. Use of Social Media by Faculty and Staff, KAN. BD. OF REGENTS 
(policy effective December 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.kansasregents.org/policy_chapter_ii_f_use_of_social_media. 
108. Id. § 6(b)(1). 
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speak on matters of public concern as private citizens, if they 
choose to do so, including through social media.”109  However, 
what defines a “private citizen” is not articulated, but rather is 
based on institutional identity and branding: 
 
The Board supports the responsible use of 
existing and emerging communications 
technologies, including social media, to serve the 
teaching, research, and public service missions of 
the state universities. These communications 
technologies are powerful tools for advancing 
state university missions, but at the same time 
pose risks of substantial harm to personal 
reputations and to the efficient operation of the 
higher education system.110 
 
The policy also does not reference how people often include 
their job title as part of their identity as a common practice 
within professional circles, including academia, or include 
references to their alma mater or school of employment 
through fan participation: 
 
When determining whether a particular use of 
social media constitutes an improper use, the 
following shall be considered: academic freedom 
principles, the employee’s position within the 
university, whether the employee used or 
publicized the university name, brands, website, 
official title or school/department/college or 
otherwise created the appearance of the 
communication being endorsed, approved or 
connected to the university in a manner that 
discredits the university, whether the 
communication was made during the employee’s 
working hours and whether the communication 
was transmitted utilizing university systems or 
 
109. Id. § 6(a). 
110. Id. § 6(b). 
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equipment.111 
 
If one was an employee of a university in Kansas, looking 
at the disciplinary standard above, would one be able to refer to 
one’s job title within a personal blog, or display their 
participation as a fan at sporting events, such as wearing team 
merchandise?112  Based on this definition, any personal 
identifier shared online, even casually (i.e. career/place of 
employment, favorite sports team, participation in a 
performance or talk) could be grounds for employment 
termination.  Considering that the default of social media 
cultural norms is the open sharing of personal information to 
define an individual’s online identity, the law and online 
culture continue to be at odds. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have explored the question of who gets 
to determine when an individual’s online speech represents - or 
hurts - a company or brand. For professional athletes and 
employees with true negotiated contracts, restricting or 
monitoring an individual’s “free time” speech could 
theoretically be an acceptable response (ex. a “moral contracts” 
provision.).  After all, when both parties have true economic 
power to either enter into the contract – or not, with lawyers 
representing both sides, interference by courts or policymakers 
seems unnecessary. 
However, when most employees either have contracts of 
adhesion or instead are at-will employees, employers should 
not have social media policies that unfairly restrict their 
employees’ social media usage when not on the job.  Creating a 
simplified national regulatory regime where the default is 
privacy for social media accounts would help protect the 
 
111. Id. § 6(b)(4). 
112. Richard E. Levy, The Tweet Hereafter: Social Media and the Free 
Speech Rights of Kansas Public University Employees, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 78, 106 (2014) (“[T]he original Social Media Policy would appear to 
authorize the University to revoke my tenure and dismiss me for the 
publication of this article using social media if it determined that my analysis 
or conclusions are contrary to its interests.”). 
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interests of employees.  Also, this default would better allow 
the public to see statements from individuals as reflecting only 
their own views rather than automatically as statements 
reflecting viewpoints of an employer.  Moving to the point 
where the public views social media from an individual in their 
“private” space as reflecting upon them, rather than also on 
their employer will take time – and adjustment. 
Using the example of student athletes, many had social 
media accounts before their athletic vocations became of 
interest to the potential financial interest of educational 
institutions that might also be their employer.  And like any 
other student – or employee, they may indeed interact on social 
media in a way that others wish they had not.  There are much 
more important issues and structural problems regarding 
student-athletes, including how students are impacted by 
concerns over with maintaining team image and profitability 
(e.g. the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill eligibility 
academic fraud scandal113) not to mention potential crime 
cover-ups. Focusing on social media use prioritizes “low-
hanging fruit” over systemic problems in academic policy. 
On the other hand, executives, human resource 
professionals, and others who have direct control over hiring 
and firing, based on their relationship to other employees, have 
a demonstrated obligation to not engage in discriminatory 
practices.  The conundrum is that evaluating an individual’s 
work based on what they say on social media is only reflecting 
a small segment of an individual’s daily life or opinions. 
Someone could be acting in a legally indefensible manner in 
regards to hiring, regardless of their social media presence; 
focusing on social media is the wrong nexus – or at the very 
least, the easy nexus.  For now, the approach that federal 
financial regulators take regarding social media, whether a 
statement could be seen as directed by or standing in for the 
viewpoint of the employer, is the closest to a well-balanced 
legal test as presently available. 
However, social media technology and online cultural 
norms now make the lives and the speech of employees public 
 
113. Jack Stripling, Widespread Nature of Chapel Hill's Academic Fraud 
Is Laid Bare, CHRON. OF HIGH. EDUC. (Oct. 23, 2014), 
https://chronicle.com/article/Widespread-Nature-of-Chapel/149603/. 
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in ways that were previously obscured.  Additionally, social 
media technology and online cultural norms blur the line 
between who is considered an audience versus a friend, or an 
individual versus a brand.  With this in mind, there should be 
limitations to the ability for an employer to control or monitor 
the social media activity and speech of an employee that has no 
direct impact on the public perception of the company. 
In the end, the question remains – how intrusive do we 
want employers to be in the lives of their employees?  Most 
employers have a list of characteristics that they do not make 
employment decisions about, some required by law. During the 
time of employment, an employer may seek to restrict 
employee speech that may negatively impact a company’s 
bottom line, such as union organizing. 
While many individuals participate in social media 
platforms intending to connect with peers or families, there is 
an unacknowledged public-facing role assumed as well, due to 
the functionality of these services. Current law and policy 
about social media and employees approach social media 
websites primarily as a platform for marketing or professional 
discussion, but do not fully address the issue of social 
networking, that is – the activity and behavior that drives the 
activity of social media websites. Future focus should more 
closely observe the ever-changing and reciprocal impact of 
online behavioral activity, technology functionality, and 
business use that drive how social media websites are used, 
and impact how people work, live, and play online, often at the 
same time. 
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Appendix: State Laws Regarding Employer and Educational 
Institution Regulation of Employees and Higher Education 
Students  
(as of May 2014) 
 
State Bill # Status Type of Limitation  
Arkansas 
H.B. 
1901114 
April 22, 2013; 
Signed by 
Governor, Act 
1480 
Prohibits an employer 
from requiring or 
requesting a current 
or prospective 
employee from 
disclosing his or her 
username or 
password for a social 
media account. 
Arkansas 
H.B. 
1902115 
April 8, 2013. 
Signed by 
Governor, Act 
998. 
Prohibits an 
institution of higher 
education from 
requiring or 
requesting a current 
or prospective 
employee or student 
from disclosing his or 
her username or 
password for a social 
media account. 
  
 
114. H.B. 1901, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). 
115. H.B. 1902, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). 
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California 
A.B. 
1844116 
September 27, 
2012. Signed 
by Governor, 
Chapter 618. 
Prohibits an employer 
from requiring or 
requesting an 
employee or 
applicant for 
employment to 
disclose a user name 
or password for the 
purpose of accessing 
personal social media 
to access personal 
social media in the 
presence of the 
employer, or to 
divulge any personal 
social media. 
Prohibits an employer 
from discharging, 
disciplining, 
threatening to 
discharge or 
discipline, or 
otherwise retaliating 
against an employee 
or applicant for not 
complying with a 
request or demand by 
a violating employer. 
  
 
116. Assemb. B. 1844, 2012 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
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California S.B. 1349117 
September 27, 
2012. Signed 
by Governor, 
Chapter 619. 
Prohibits public and 
private postsecondary 
educational 
institutions, 
employees and 
representatives from 
requiring or 
requesting a student, 
prospective student, 
or student group to 
disclose personal 
social media 
information. Prohibits 
such institutions from 
threatening or taking 
certain actions for 
refusal of a demand 
for such information. 
Requires certain 
actions by such 
institutions to ensure 
compliance with 
these provisions. 
Requires such 
institution to post 
social media privacy 
policy on its web site. 
Colorado 
H.B. 
1046118 
May 11, 2013. 
Signed by 
Governor, 
Chapter 195. 
Concerns employer 
access to personal 
information through 
electronic 
communication 
devices. 
 
117. S.B. 1349, 2012 S. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
118. H.B. 1046, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013). 
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Delaware  H.B. 309119 
July20, 
2012.Signed by 
Governor, 
Chapter 354. 
Makes it unlawful for 
a public or nonpublic 
academic institution 
to mandate that a 
student or applicant 
disclose password or 
account information 
granting the academic 
institution access to 
students’ or 
applicants’ social 
networking profile or 
account. Prohibits 
academic institutions 
from requesting that a 
student or applicant 
log onto a personal 
social media account. 
Illinois 
H.B. 
3782120 
August 1, 
2012. Signed 
by Governor. 
Public Act 97-
0875.  
Amends the Right to 
Privacy in the 
Workplace Act. 
Provides that it shall 
be unlawful for any 
employer to ask any 
prospective employee 
to provide any 
username, password, 
or other related 
account information 
in order to gain 
access to a social 
networking website 
where that 
prospective employee 
maintains an account 
or profile. 
 
119. H.B. 309, 146th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2012). 
120. H.B. 3782, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012). 
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Illinois H.B. 64121 
Aug. 2, 2013. 
Signed by 
Governor, 
Public Act No. 
129. 
Creates the Right to 
Privacy in the School 
Setting Act. Defines 
“school” as an 
institution of higher 
learning as defined in 
the Higher Education 
Student Assistance 
Act, a public 
elementary or 
secondary school or 
school district, or a 
nonpublic school 
recognized by the 
State Board of 
Education. Provides 
that it is unlawful for 
a school to request or 
require a student or 
prospective student or 
his or her parent or 
guardian to provide a 
password or other 
related account 
information in order 
to gain access to the 
student’s or 
prospective student’s 
account or profile on 
a social networking 
website or to demand 
access in any manner 
to a student’s or 
prospective student’s 
account or profile on 
a social networking 
website. 
 
121. H.B. 64, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013). 
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Illinois S.B. 2306122 
Aug. 16, 2013. 
Signed by 
Governor, 
Public Act No. 
501. 
Amends the Right to 
Privacy in the 
Workplace Act; 
provides that the 
restriction on an 
employer’s request 
for information 
concerning an 
employee’s social 
networking profile or 
website applies to 
only the employee’s 
personal account; 
defines terms; 
provides that 
employers are not 
prohibited from 
complying with the 
rules of self-
regulatory 
organizations. 
  
 
122. S.B. 2306, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013). 
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Louisiana H.B. 340123 
May 22, 2014. 
Signed by 
Governor, Act 
No. 16. 
Creates the Personal 
Online Account 
Privacy Protection 
Act; prohibits 
employers and 
educational 
institutions from 
requesting or 
requiring individuals 
to disclose 
information that 
allows access to or 
observation of 
personal online 
accounts; prohibits 
employers and 
educational 
institutions from 
taking certain actions 
for failure to disclose 
information that 
allows access to 
personal online 
accounts; limits 
liability for failure to 
search or monitor the 
activity of personal 
online accounts. 
Maine H.B. 838124 
May 1, 2013. 
Enacted,  
Chapter 112. 
Directs a study of 
social media privacy 
in schools and the 
workplace. 
 
123. H.B. 340, 2014 Reg. Leg. Sess. (La. 2014). 
124. H.B. 838, 126th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013). 
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Maryland 
H.B. 964125 
S.B. 433126 
May 2, 2012.  
Signed by 
Governor,  
Chapter 
232/233.  
Prohibits an employer 
from requesting or 
requiring that an 
employee or 
applicant disclose any 
user name, password, 
or other means for 
accessing a personal 
account or service 
through specified 
electronic 
communications 
devices. 
Michigan 
H.B. 
5523127 
Dec. 27, 2012. 
Signed by 
Governor,  
Public Act 478. 
Prohibits employers 
and educational 
institutions from 
requiring certain 
individuals to 
disclose information 
that allows access to 
certain social 
networking accounts. 
Prohibits employers 
and educational 
institutions from 
taking certain actions 
for failure to disclose 
information that 
allows access to 
certain social 
networking accounts. 
Nevada A.B. 181128 
June 13, 2013. 
Signed by 
Governor. 
Chapter 548. 
Makes various 
changes to provisions 
governing 
employment 
practices. 
 
125. H.B. 964, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012). 
126. S.B. 433, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012). 
127. H.B. 5523, 96th Leg., 2012 Sess. (Mich. 2012). 
128. A.B. 181, 77th Reg. Ses. (N.V. 2013). 
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New Jersey 
A.B. 
2879129 
December 3, 
2012. Signed 
by Governor, 
Chapter 75.  
Prohibits requirement 
to disclose user name, 
password, or other 
means for accessing 
account or service 
through electronic 
communications 
devices by 
institutions of higher 
education. 
New Jersey 
A.B. 
2878130 
Aug. 28, 2013. 
Signed by 
Governor, 
Chapter No. 
2013-155 
Prohibits requirement 
to disclose user name, 
password, or other 
means for accessing 
account or service 
through electronic 
communications 
device by employers. 
New Mexico S.B. 371131 
April 5, 2013. 
Signed by 
Governor, 
Chapter 222. 
Relates to 
employment; 
prohibits prospective 
employers from 
requesting or 
requiring a 
prospective employee 
to provide a password 
or access to the 
prospective 
employee’s social 
networking account. 
  
 
129. A.B. 2879, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012). 
130. A.B. 2878, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012). 
131. S.B. 371, 2013 Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2013). 
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New Mexico S.B. 422132 
April 5, 2013. 
Signed by 
Governor, 
Chapter 223. 
Relates to education; 
prohibits public and 
private institutions of 
post-secondary 
education from 
requesting or 
requiring a student, 
applicant or potential 
applicant for 
admission to provide 
a password or access 
to the social 
networking account 
of the student or 
applicant for 
admission. 
 
Oklahoma 
H.B. 
2372133 
May 21, 2014. 
Signed by 
Governor, 
Chap. 315. 
Relates to labor; 
prohibits employer 
from requesting or 
requiring access to 
social media account 
of certain employees; 
prohibits an employer 
from taking 
retaliatory personnel 
action for failure to 
provide access to 
social media account; 
authorizes civil 
actions for violations; 
provides for recovery 
of attorney fees and 
court costs; defines 
terms; provides for 
codification; provides 
an effective date. 
 
132. S.B. 422, 2013 Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2013). 
133. H.B. 2372, 54th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2014). 
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Oregon 
H.B. 
2654134 
May 22, 2013; 
Signed by 
Governor. 
Chapter 204.  
Prohibits an employer 
from compelling 
employee or 
applicant for 
employment to 
provide access to 
personal social media 
account or to add 
employer to social 
media contact list; 
prohibits retaliation 
by employer against 
employee or 
applicant for refusal 
to provide access to 
accounts or to add 
employer to contact 
list; prohibits certain 
educational 
institutions from 
compelling student or 
prospective student to 
provide access to 
personal social media 
account. 
Oregon S.B. 344135 
June 13, 2013; 
Signed by 
Governor. 
Chapter 408.  
Provides that a public 
or private educational 
institution may not 
require, request or 
otherwise compel a 
student or prospective 
student to disclose or 
to provide access to a 
personal social media 
account. 
 
134. H.B. 2654, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013). 
135. S.B. 344, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013). 
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Tennessee S.B. 1808136 
May 16, 2014. 
Signed by 
Governor, 
Chapter 826. 
Creates the Employee 
Online Privacy Act of 
2014 which prevents 
an employer from 
requiring an 
employee to disclose 
the username and 
password for the 
employee’s personal 
internet account 
except under certain 
circumstances. 
Utah H.B. 100137 
March 26, 
2013. Signed 
by Governor, 
Chapter 94. 
Modifies provisions 
addressing labor in 
general and higher 
education to enact 
protections for 
personal Internet 
accounts; enacts the 
Internet Employment 
Privacy Act, 
including defining 
terms, permitting or 
prohibiting certain 
actions by an 
employer; provides 
that the chapter does 
not create certain 
duties; provides 
private right of 
action; enacts the 
Internet 
Postsecondary 
Education Privacy 
Act. 
 
136. S.B. 1808, 108th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2014). 
137. H.B. 100, 2013 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2013). 
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Vermont S.B. 7138 
June 3, 2013.  
Signed by 
Governor, Act 
47 
Relates to social 
networking privacy 
protection. 
Washington S.B. 5211139 
May 21, 2013. 
Signed by 
Governor, 
Chapter 330. 
Relates to 
employment practice; 
requires an employer 
cannot require any 
employee or 
prospective employee 
to submit any 
password or other 
related account 
information in order 
to gain access to the 
individual’s personal 
social networking 
website account or 
profile. 
  
 
138. S.B. 7, 2013-14 Gen. Assemb., Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2013). 
139. S.B. 5211, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013). 
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Wisconsin S.B. 223140 
Jan. 22, 2014. 
Signed by 
Governor, Act 
208. 
Relates to employer 
access to, and 
observation of, the 
personal Internet 
accounts of 
employees and 
applicants for 
employment; relates 
to educational 
institution access to, 
and observation of, 
the personal Internet 
accounts of students 
and prospective 
students; relates to 
landlord access to, 
and observation of, 
the personal Internet 
accounts of tenants 
and prospective 
tenants; provides a 
penalty. 
 
 
 
140. S.B. 223, 2013-14 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wis. 2014). 
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